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THE COASE THEOREM AND THE
THEORY OF THE STATE*
JAMES M. BUCHANAN**

Things were really quite simple in the post-Pigovian world of
microeconomic policy, a world characterized by possible divergencies
between private and social marginal cost (or product). The classically
nefarious factory might be observed to spew its smoke on the
neighboring housewife's laundry, and in so doing impose costs that
were not reckoned in its presumed strict profit-maximizing calculus.
The remedy seemed straightforward. The "government" should
impose a corrective tax on the factory owner, related directly to the
smoke-generating output (or, if required, a particular input) and
measured by the marginal external or spillover cost. Through this
device the firm would be forced to make its decisions on the basis of a
"socially correct" comparison of costs and revenues. Its profit-mazimizing objective should then lead it to results that would be "socially
optimal."
Things have not seemed nearly so simple since R. H. Coase
presented his analysis of social cost.1 Coase's central insight lay in his
recognition that there are two sides to any potential economic
interdependence, two parties to any potential exchange, and that this
insures at least some pressure toward fully voluntary and freely
negotiated agreements. Moreover, such agreements tend to insure the
attainment of efficiency without the necessity of goverrmental
intervention beyond the initial definition of rights and the enforcement of contracts. Applied to the example in hand, if the damage to
the housewife's laundry exceeds in value the benefits that the firm
derives from allowing its stacks to smoke, a range of mutual gain
exists, and utility and profit-maximizing behavior on the part of the
two parties involved will result in at least some reduction in the
observed level of smoke damage, a reduction that can be taken to be
efficient in terms of total product value. No governmental remedy
may be called for at all, and indeed Coase argued that attempted
correction by government might create inefficiency. Such intervention might forestall or distort the negotiations between the affected
parties. As a further aspect of his analysis, Coase advanced the
*I am indebted to my colleagues Winston Bush, Dennis Mueller, and Gordon Tullock for
helpful suggestions.
**Director, Center for the Study of Public Choice, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University.
1. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1-44 (1960).
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theorem on allocational neutrality that now bears his name. This
states that under idealized conditions when transactions costs are
absent and where income-effect feedbacks are not relevant, the
allocational results of voluntarily negotiated agreements will be
invariant over differing assignments of property rights among the
parties to the interaction.
Much of the discussion since 1960 has involved the limitations of
this theorem in the presence of positive transactions costs. In this
setting, differing assignments of rights may affect allocative outcomes.
Furthermore, the transactions costs barrier to voluntarily negotiated
agreements that can be classified as tolerably efficient may be all but
prohibitive in some situations, notably those that may require
simultaneous agreement among many parties. The generalized transactions costs rubric may be used to array alternative institutional
structures, with the implied objective being that of minimizing these
costs.
My purpose in this paper is not to elaborate these extensions and/or
limitations of the Coase analysis, many of which have become
familiar even if an exhaustive taxonomy of cases has not been
completed. My purpose is almost the opposite. I want to extend the
Coase analysis, within his assumptions of zero transactions costs and
insignificant income-effect feedbacks, to differing institutional settings
than those that have normally been implicitly assumed in the
discussions of the neutrality theorem. This approach leads to the
question: Why did Coase suggest that the Pigovian prescriptions
might produce inefficient results? Or, to put this somewhat
differently, why does the theorem of allocational neutrality stop short
at certain ill-defined institutional limits? Why can it not be extended
to encompass all possible institutional variations, variations that may
be broadly interpreted as differences in the assignments of property
rights? What is there in the implied Pigovian institutional framework
that might inhibit the voluntary negotiations among parties, always
assuming zero transactions costs? If the neutrality theorem holds, why
should the political economist be overly concerned about institutional
reform, as such?
There is a paradox of sorts here between the theorem of allocational neutrality, interpreted in its most general sense, and Coase's
basic policy position. One implication of the theorem, so interpreted,
would be that the thrust of classical political economy may have been
misdirected. Adam Smith's central message points toward institutional reform and reconstruction as means of guaranteeing overall
efficiency in resource usage, and, as noted, we can always interpret
institutions as embodying specific property rights. Governmental
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authorities were to be stripped of their traditionally established rights
to interfere in the workings of the market economy; or, stated
conversely, individual traders were to be granted rights to negotiate
on their own terms. The central theorem of classical economies might
be summarized as the demonstration of the differences in allocational
results under divergent institutional structures. I do not think that
Coase would disagree with my statements here, and I think that he
shares with me an admiration for Adam Smith and that Coase, too,
places Smith's emphasis on institutional-structural reform above the
modern policy emphasis on detailed and particularistic manipulation
of observed results.
The apparent paradox may be resolved when we take account of
the theory of the state or of government that is, perhaps surprisingly,
shared by Adam Smith, Pigou, and Coase. My argument proceeds in
several steps. First, it is necessary to distinguish carefully between
property rights and liability rules. Secondly, I shall demonstrate that
governmental or collective action, if conceived in the Wicksellian
framework or model, does not modify the applicability of the
neutrality theorem. Thirdly, I shall show that government, conceived
in a non-Wicksellian model, need not modify the applicability of the
theorem, but that, in such case, property rights are explicitly changed
with the introduction of governmental action. Finally, I shall suggest
that the theory of government decision-making implicit in both
classical and neoclassical economics, and carried over in Coase's
analysis, offers the source of the seemingly paradoxical limits on the
neutrality theorem.
PROPERTY RULES AND LIABILITY RULES
In his basic paper, Coase did not carefully make a distinction
between the assignment of rights to particular individuals and the
rules determining the liability of particular individuals for damage
that their behavior might impose on others. His example, the
now-familiar one of the interaction between the rancher and the
farmer, was discussed in terms of alternative rules for bearing liability
for damages. Either the rancher, whose cattle strayed onto the
neighboring croplands, was liable for damages that the farmer might
suffer, or he was not liable. If both cattle and grain were marketed
competitively, the neutrality theorem showed that the same allocative outcome would be generated, regardless of which set of liability
rules should be in existence. In the former case, the rancher, knowing
in advance that he would be liable for damages caused by his straying
animals, would include these payments as an anticipated cost in
making his size-of-herd decisions. In the latter case, the farmer,
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knowing that he can collect no damages from the rancher (and that he
must respect the property rights of the rancher to cattle), will find it
advantageous to initiate payments to the latter in exchange for
agreements limiting the size of herd, if indeed the value of crop
damage at the margin exceeds the value of the additional grazing to
the rancher.
Coase overlooked the fact that the institutional structure was
significantly different in the two cases. In the second case, the shift
toward an efficient outcome takes place through an ordinary market
or exchange process, in which none other than the two parties need
get involved. In the first case, however, as presented by Coase, there
must be third-party interference by a "judge" to assess charges for
damage that has been done. In the context of his discussions, this
institutional difference does not matter, since the third-party can,
presumably, measure and assess damages with complete accuracy.
The difference is nonetheless important in the more general setting.
Consistency should have dictated that the first case be presented, not
as one where the rancher was liable ex post for damages caused by his
straying animals, but as one where the farmer held enforceable
property rights in his croplands, rights that were inviolate except on
his own agreement. In this framework, the rancher would have had to
negotiate an agreement with the farmer in advance of any actual
straying of cattle. This converts the institutional setting on this side
into one that is parallel to the converse case. No third party, no judge,
is required to intervene and to assess damages ex post.
We may define this setting as one in which property rules are
established and enforced, as opposed to liability rules. 2 This setting
calls direct attention to the motivation that both parties have to
exploit the potentially realizable surplus by moving from the initial
inefficient position. This setting also allows for an extension of the
neutrality-efficiency theorem beyond those strictly objectifiable
circumstances suggested to be present in the Coase example. If the
precise degree of damage caused by external imposition is ambiguous,
the third party must necessarily exercise his own best judgment in
making a settlement. By contrast, if property rules are defined, with
2. This terminology is adopted from the discussion by Calabresi and Melamed, whose paper
clarifies the distinction between these two. As they state, a property rile "is the form of
entitlement which gives rise to the least amount of state intervention." See Calabresi &
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
Harv. L. Rev. 1089-146 (1972); see also Demsetz, Some Aspects of PropertyRights, 9 J. Law &
Econ. 64-5 (1966).
In a paper to be published, I have also called attention to the distinction between these two
institutional arrangements, noting in particular the necessary resort to third-party action under
liability rules. See Buchanan, The Institutional Structure of Externality, Pub. Choice (forthcoming).
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the necessity of prior agreement on the part of the potentially
damaged party, the latter's own subjective assessment of potential
damage becomes controlling in determining the range over which
final outcomes may settle. This assessment is, of course, a better
measure of actual value lost than the estimate made by any third
party.
WICKSELLIAN UNANIMITY
For my purposes in this paper, the specification that parties to an
interaction are defined by property rather than liability rules facilitates relating the Coase theorem on allocational neutrality to the
underlying conception or theory of government or of the State. In the
simplest possible model, we may conceive of a polity that is limited
in membership to the parties directly involved in the potential
interaction. The interacting group can be made coincident in
membership with the political unit. On this basis, we can interpret
the "trades" among the parties as being analogous to collective or
governmental decisions reached under the operation of a Wicksellian
rule of unanimity. 3 Consider either the earlier factory-housewife
example, or Coase's familiar rancher-farmer one. In either illustration, we can think of the two-party group as comprising the
all-inclusive membership in the political community, in which case
agreement between the two parties on any matter is equivalent to
unanimous accord. Resort to third-party adjudication is impossible for
the simple reason that no third party exists.
From this context, it becomes easier to conceive "the State" merely
as the instrumental means or device through which individuals
attempt to carry out activities aimed at securing jointly-desired
objectives. This is, of course, the traditional framework for all theories
of social-contract origins of government. In this setting, all activities
of the public sector are explained in exchange terms, even if it is
recognized that the exchange process is significantly more complex
than that which makes up the central subject matter of orthodox
economic theory. There is at least no conceptual or logical necessity
to think of "the State" as an entity that exists separate from and apart
from citizens.
If we remain within the strict contractarian conception of collective action, where all decisions require unanimous consent by all
3. Collective decision-making under a rule of unanimity is associated with the name of Knut
Wicksell in modem public-finance theory analysis because he proposed institutional reforms
that embodied unanimity in the reaching of tax and expenditure decisions. See, K. Wicksell,
Finanztheoretische Untersuchungen (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1896). The central portion of this
work appears in English translation as, A New Principle of Just Taxation, in Classics in the
Theory of Public Finance 72-118 (R. Musgrave &A. Peacock ed. 1959).
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members of the political community, and if we retain the assumption
that transactions costs are absent, the Coase theorem on allocational
neutrality may be applied beyond those limits within which it has
normally been discussed. In this model, collective or governmental
decision-making remains equivalent to freely-negotiated voluntary
exchange. Hence, there is little or no cause for concern about
"governmental intervention" as such, because any action that might
properly be classified as "governmental" would not emerge unless all
parties agree on the contractual terms.
Differences in the assignment of rights might, as in the standard
simple exchange cases, generate differences in distributional outcomes, but the contractual process would lead to allocational results
that are both efficient and invariant. Consider a classic example, that
introduces what we may appropriately call collective or public goods,
David Hume's villagers whose utility would be increased by drainage
of a meadow. The neutrality theorem, applied to this example,
demonstrates that an efficient and unchanged allocational result will
emerge from freely-negotiated contract whether the postulated initial
position should be one in which individuals own separate plots of land
through which the swampy stream flows or whether the whole
meadow is defined as communal property, accessible to all parties.
With an effective unanimity rule, and with zero transactions costs, the
complex exchange that is required for efficiency would be worked out
under any initial structure of individual rights. The sharing of the
gross gains-from-trade among separate persons would, of course, be
influenced by the particular property assignment in being. If the
sharing of such gains modifies individual demands for the common
good, at the margin, that is, if income effects are present, differing
assignments can produce slight differences in allocational results, but,
under the assumptions here, those results produced will continue to
be efficient.
SIMPLE MAJORITY VOTING
When the unanimity requirement for collective decisions is abandoned, governmental action no longer represents a complex equivalent
of a voluntary exchange process. 4 If decisions that are to be binding
over the inclusive group can be made by a subset of this group, there
is no guarantee that a particular individual holds against the
4. It is possible to use the analogue to voluntary exchange at the level of constitutional, as
opposed to day-to-day choice. That is to say, we might analyze the selection of a political
constitution, the rules for the reaching of collective decisions, under a postulated unanimity
rule. It is then possible to derive a logical basis for non-unanimity rules from unanimous
agreement at the constitutional level. This is the approach taken in J. Buchanan & G. Tullock,
The Calculus of Consent (1962).
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imposition of net harm or damage. Once his own contractual
agreement to the terms of governmental or collective action is
dropped as a requirement, an individual can no longer be certain that
he will share in the gross gains that governmental action will,
presumably, generate. From this it seems to follow that collective
action, motivated by improvement in the positions of members of a
decisive coalition smaller than the totality of community membership, need not produce results that are efficient, even with zero
transactions costs. 5 Any nonunanimity voting rule, for example, that
of simple majority voting, would seem to produce results that may be,
in the net, inefficient.
The neutrality theorum is, however, more powerful than might be
suggested by cursory attention to this example. Efficient outcomes
will tend to emerge from the contractual process, even under
less-than-unanimity voting rules for collective action, if the modified
structure of property rights consequent on the departure from
unanimity is acknowledged, and if individuals are allowed freely to
negotiate trades in these rights. Economists have not fully incorporated the property-rights structure of less-than-unanimity voting rules
into their orthodoxy, and they tend to stop short of the extension of
the neutrality theorem herein suggested.
Consider a situation in which individuals hold well-defined rights,
which are acknowledged by all parties, and which are known to be
enforceable without costs. If no collective action is undertaken,
individuals trade such rights among themselves in simple exchanges,
insuring mutuality of gain. If collective action is undertaken, but only
on the agreement of all parties, mutality of gain (or, at the limit,
absence of loss) is insured. If this requirement is dropped, and
individuals may be subjected to damage or harm through collective
action, the value of their initial holdings is necessarily changed, again
on the assumption of zero transactions costs. Individuals no longer
hold claims that are inviolate against imposed reductions in value. A
new and ambiguous set of rights is brought into being by the
authorization of governmental action taken without the approval of
all parties. Any potentially decisive decision-making coalition, a
simple majority of voters in our example here, possesses rights to the
nominal holdings of the minority. These rights are, in this instance,
ambiguous because they emerge only upon the identification of the
majority coalition that is to be decisive with respect to the issue under
5. With zero transactions costs, any departure from unanimity voting rules for collective
action would hardly be acceptable at the constitutional level. But this modification is
introduced here for purposes of developing the exposition of the argument, not for descriptive
relevance.
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consideration for collective action. Once identified, however, members of the effective majority hold potentially marketable rights.
These may be exchanged, directly or indirectly, and the contractual
process will again insure that the efficient allocative outcome will be
achieved, and that this will be invariant, given the appropriate
assumptions about transactions costs and income effects.
We may illustrate this in a highly-simplified three-person example.
Consider a community that includes three men: A, B, and C.
Collective decisions are to be made by simple majority voting. Initial
holdings of units of an all-purpose and numberable consumption good
are, let us say, 100 for A, 60 for B, and 30 for C. In this environment,
let us suppose that a governmental project is proposed, one that
promises to yield benefits of 30 units, distributed equally among the
three persons. The gross costs of this project are, however, 40 units;
clearly, the proposal is inefficient. Despite this, if B and C can
succeed in organizing themselves into a majority coalition, and if they
can impose the full tax costs of the proposal on A, they can make net
gains. In this case, the results would appear as follows:
Person
A
B
C

Benefits
10
10
10

Costs
40
0
0

Net
-30
10
10

Once B and C are identified as the decisive members of the coalition,
however, individual A can negotiate trades, or side payments, that
will be mutually beneficial to all parties, and which will keep this
inefficient outcome from being achieved. Individual A can, for
example, offer either B or C a net gain of 15 units to join a different
majority coalition that will disapprove the project. Or, if both B and
C hold firm, they can exact from A a payment of 10 units for their
agreement to withhold the project. The side payments, which must be
allowed to take place under our assumption of zero transactions costs,
will insure that all inefficient projects are forestalled, and, similarly,
that all efficient projects will be carried out.6
The values to individuals of the "property rights in franchise"
6. It is often erroneously argued that individuals with the superior economic power, A in our
example, can exercise more influence in the formation of dominant coalitions than individuals
with inferior economic power, C in our example. If, however, C fully recognizes the exploitation
potential available in the situation described, he can offer B precisely the same terms as those
offered by A. In the basic arithmetic here, there is no more likelihood that the net gains from
not undertaking the project, 10 units, will be shared by A rather than by B or C. In effect, the
Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution set of imputations to the simple majority game becomes:
(0,5,5).
(5,5,0)
(5,0,5)
For an elaboration of this analysis, see, Buchanan & Tullock supra note 4, at chs. II and 12.
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embodied in a majority-voting regime depend critically on the
constitutional limits within which majorities are allowed to take
collective-political action. These values will also depend on the
technological possibilities for potential coalition gains within the
given set of constitutional constraints defined-. Detailed exploration of
these interesting and mostly unresolved issues would not be suitable in
this paper. For present purposes, the points to be recognized are,
firstly, that any departure from unanimity in collective decision
processes modifies the structure of rights from that which is defined
exclusively by private-sector claims and obligations, and, secondly,
that even with this modified set of rights, the theorum on allocational
neutrality remains valid within the required, and highly restricted,
assumptions concerning transactions costs and income effects. 7
ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY
In traditional economic-policy discussions, the arguments for
and/or against governmental intervention in the private sector rarely
take place under explicitly defined models for collective decision
making. For the most part, those who propose "corrections" to the
outcomes of voluntary exchange processes, like those who oppose
them, are content to treat governmental decisions as exogenous to the
valuations of the persons in the economy itself. If, however, these
arguments are interpreted consistently within any collective decision-making framework, the structure that can most readily be
inferred is neither that of unanimity nor simple majority voting. The
model of government that accords most closely with economic policy
discussions is one in which authority to take collective action is vested
in an administrator, a bureaucrat, an expert, who chooses for the
community, presumably on the basis of his own version of the "public
interest," or, in technical economist's jargon, some "social welfare
function."
It is useful, therefore, to extend our analysis of the theorem on
allocational neutrality to this administrative-decision model of public
choice. Probably because the model is essentially implicit rather than
explicitly postulated, little or no attention has been paid to the
alternative means through which the single decision-maker for the
collectivity may be selected. Nor need this concern us here. Strictly
7. In another paper, I have developed somewhat more fully some of the possible implications
of the modified rights structure that majority voting rules embody. See Buchanan, The Political
Economy of the Welfare State, Center for the Study of Public Choice Research Paper No.
808231-1-8 (June, 1972). This paper was prepared for the Conference on Capitalism and
Freedom, in honor of Milton Friedman, in Charlottesville, Virginia, October 1972; it will be
published in the volume of conference proceedings.
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speaking, the conclusions developed below follow whether the
decision-maker be divinely ordained, democratically elected, arbitrarily appointed, selected in competitive examination, or hereditarily
determined. 8 I want to examine a model in which a single person has
been empowered to make decisions for a whole community. This
defines a specific structure of rights, an assignment, and the problem is
to determine the allocative results that will emerge in comparison
with those predicted under alternative structures. The first point to be
noted is the same as that made with respect to simple majority voting.
The delegation of decision-making power to the single person
modifies the set of rights in existence, even prior to the onset of any
imposed governmental action. The designated chooser for the community holds potentially valued claims that were nonexistent before
he is constitutionally authorized to act.
Consider again Hume's drainage of the village meadow. Instead of
operating through a rule of unanimity, we now assume that the
village has empowered a single person to act on behalf of all persons
in the group and, furthermore, it is acknowledged that his decisions
will be enforced. Formally, it does not matter whether the decisionmaker is chosen from within or from outside the group. For
expositional simplicity, however, we shall assume that he is selected
from outside the village. We now assume that a drainage project,
lumpy in nature, will yield symmetrically distributed benefits to
villagers valued at 1000 units of the numeraire commodity. The
project will cost a total of 800 units and the taxing institution requires
symmetrical sharing. The project is clearly Pareto-efficient, and, as
indicated earlier, under an operating rule of unanimity, the project
will be undertaken, given our zero transactions costs assumption, and
including all free-rider behavior under the transactions costs rubric.
The question becomes: Would this project necessarily be selected by
the single decision-maker, the alternative structure of property rights
under consideration?
It is illegitimate to assume that the single administrator knows the
preferences of the citizens, or, even should these be estimated with
accuracy, that he would necessarily embody individual values dollarfor-dollar in his own choice calculus. The administrator or bureaucrat will select the project if the costs that he bears are less than the
benefits that he, personally, secures. But these costs and benefits are
not, and cannot possibly be, those of the community of citizens.
Apparently, there is nothing in this model to insure correspondence
8. The method of selection may affect the motivation of the decision-maker and, in this way,
modify the likelihood that the behavioral hypotheses implicit in the orthodox conceptions will
be corroborated.
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between the bureaucrat's choices and those results that are to be
classified as efficient by orthodox economists' criteria. This suggests
that the theorem of allocational neutrality breaks down.
If, however, we move beyond this naive model of administrative
behavior, the applicability of the neutrality theorem may be restored.
By acting in accordance with his own subjective evaluation, the
bureaucrat may be failing to maximize the value of the property right
that has been assigned to him constitutionally. To show this, let us
assume that, naively, the decision-taker decides against the project
noted. In this decision, he deprives the citizenry of benefits valued at
1000 units and, at the same time, avoids the imposition of tax costs of
800 units on the community. In a setting with zero transactions costs,
where large numbers can readily reach contractual agreements, the
citizenry, as an inclusive group of taxpayer-beneficiaries, would be
willing to offer side payments up to a total of 200 units to secure a
change from negative to positive action on the project. 9 If the
decision-maker, the administrator or bureaucrat, uses these side
payments, either indicatively or actually, to determine his final
choice, the drainage project will be carried out. The theorem of
allocational neutrality is apparently validated in this more sophisticated model for bureaucratic behavior. So long as the decision-maker
acts to maximize the potential rent on the property right delegated to
him, the right to make the final decision for the whole community, the
allocative result will be identical to that forthcoming under alternative rights structures, with, of course, the transactions-costs, incomeeffect assumptions postulated. As in all property-assignment shifts, the
distributional results may be quite different under differing assignments. If the bureaucrat maximizes the potential rent on his right to
choose for the group, and, furthermore, if he collects this in the form
of a personal side payment, there is an income transfer from members
of the original group to the "outsider" selected as decisiontaker. 10
9. In the numerical example, the potentially-capturable rent seems to be 200 units because
of the assumptions that both benefits and costs of the drainage project are shared symmetrically
among all of the villagers. If these assumptions are relaxed, the decision-maker can collect a
larger sum in rent. His potential gain, will, in all cases, be the sum of the larger of the positive or
the negative differences between benefits and costs, the sum being taken over all members of the
community.
10. This modifies the standard economist's treatment of the distinction between allocational
and distributional results. The latter may, for certain purposes, be neglected if the zero-sum
aspects are confined to a stable group of "members." If, however, a new rights assignment, such
as that discussed, generates distributional transfers outside the original group, the effects, for
this group, are negative-sum. Applied to the realistic setting in which transactions costs are
present, this suggests that a community may, under certain conditions, find it advantageous to
put up with allocative inefficiency rather than to secure its removal at the expense of
distributional transfers to delegated decision-takers.
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Objection may be raised to rent-maximizing as the appropriate
norm for bureaucratic behavior, even if we neglect ethical considerations (these will be introduced in Section V). To postulate that the
designated decision-maker maximizes the potential side payments
that he can receive from taxpayer-beneficiaries, as a group, implies
that the decision-maker, himself, is indifferent as among the choice
alternatives, that he places no personal evaluation on the differences
among these opportunities available to him. If, in fact, the bureaucrat
or administrator is external to the affected group of persons in the
community, this assumption may seem plausibly realistic. If, however,
he is chosen from within the community itself, his own evaluation
must be taken into account. Whether the decision-taker is selected
from within or without the original group of members, his own
evaluation can be, and must be, included in any correct assessment of
costs and benefits.
We may return to the numerical illustration introduced above.
Suppose that the gross benefits of the proposed drainage project, to all
persons other than the decision-taker, amount to 1000 units of a
numeraire good (we may call these "dollars"), and that the gross costs,
to all persons other than the decision-taker, amount to 800. Suppose,
however, that the decision-maker, himself, places a monetary value
of, say, 400 dollars on the "natural beauty" of the swampy and
undrained meadow. Even should he be required to pay no part of the
tax costs of the project, this 400 units of value necessarily becomes a
component in the total opportunity cost of the drainage scheme.
Under these conditions, the bureaucrat will refuse the proffered side
payment of 200 units. The project will not be undertaken.
Does this result suggest that the theorem of allocational neutrality
breaks down? The question of whether the decision-taker is selected
from within or without the initial membership of the group becomes
critical at this point. If the selection is internal, the project is
inefficient under the conditions suggested, and it will not be
undertaken under any rights assignment. This is because the person's
negative evaluation would be an input in any internal contractual
negotiations that might produce an allocative outcome. In this case,
the neutrality theorem remains valid. Suppose, however, that the
bureaucrat is not in the initial group of members. In such case, his
own personal evaluation of the project alternatives will not enter and
will not affect allocative outcomes when the assignment of rights is
limited to initial members. This decision-maker's evaluation will,
however, enter as a determinant when he is assigned the rights to
choose for the group. The neutrality theorem would not hold valid
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under these conditions unless the decision-maker should be, in fact,
wholly indifferent as among the choice alternatives.
This result should not be at all surprising. The theorem on
allocational neutrality, even under its restricted set of required
assumptions, should hardly be expected to extend to rights assignments that embody differing memberships in the group. For fixed
memberships, the theorem remains fully valid. Even when the
decision-maker is selected from outside, the theorem suggests that any
change in rights assignments, once the additional member is included,
among this new membership will produce identical allocational
results.
THE THEORY OF THE STATE
It is possible to interpret both the policy implications of Coase's
theorem on allocational neutrality and Pigovian corrective policy
prescriptions in terms of the underlying conceptions, models, or
theories of government. As the analysis above has suggested, under
certain conceptions of governmental process, neither Coase nor the
Pigovians should have been greatly concerned about institutional
change as means of generating allocative efficiency. If distributional
considerations are neglected, and if decision-makers for the community are chosen from within the group, the structure of rights will
modify allocative outcomes only because of differentials in levels of
transactions costs, provided that the decision-takers are motivated by
economic self-interest. The policy thrust of Coase's discussion is,
however, to the effect that governmental or collective intrusion into
the negotiation processes of the market economy tends to retard
rather than to advance movement toward allocative efficiency.
Conversely, the policy thrust of the whole Pigovian tradition is that
governmental or collective intrusion into the market economy tends
to be corrective of distortions and leads toward rather than away from
those results that might satisfy agreed-on efficiency criteria.
The Pigovian model of the state may be examined first. The
decision-taker, the person or group empowered to impose the
corrective taxes and subsidies, is presumed to act in accordance with
rules laid down for him by the welfare economist. His task is that of
measuring social costs and social benefits from alternative courses of
action, a task that he is presumed able to carry out effectively. On the
basis of such measurements, the decision-taker is to follow the rules
laid down, quite independently of the personal opportunity costs that
he may face in refusing side payment offers. The Pigovian policymaker must be an economic eunuch. The idealized allocative results
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are, of course, identical with those that would emerge under a regime
where the decision-maker is wholly "corrupt" in the sense of strict
maximization of the potential side payments or rents on his rights to
make decisions. If he is expected to behave as a rent-maximizer,
however, there would be no need for elaborated and detailed
instruction in the form of rules or norms, as derived from the theorems
of welfare economics. Within this Pigovian conception, the decisionmaker for the group does not and/or should not maximize the rental
value of the rights of decision that he is granted. This may be treated
either as a positive prediction about bureaucratic behavior or as a
normative proposition for bureaucratic behavior.
In the Coase conception," an interpretation that is similar in
certain respects seems to follow. If, in fact, governmental decisionmakers act as strict rent-maximizers, the neutrality theorem suggests
that there should be little or no concern about allocative results, per
se. The evidence of such concern must, therefore, indicate some
denial of the rent-maximizing behavioral hypothesis. Again, this may
be taken as positive prediction or normative statement. The
governmental decision-maker, the bureaucrat, empowered to act on
behalf of the group, either does not maximize rents on the rights that
he commands or he should not do so on moral-ethical grounds. In
either case, the Coase concern for allocational efficiency returns since
the negotiating pressure toward optimality is removed once the
decision-making power is shifted from the market to the public sector.
It is perhaps surprising to find common elements in the basic
conceptions of political process held by the proponents of essentially
opposing policy positions. But in both the Pigovian framework and in
that imputed here to Coase, the governmental decision-maker, either
singly or as a member of a choosing group, is and/or should be
"incorruptible." In this respect, the two conceptions of governmental
process seem identical, despite the sharp differences in information
possibilities attributed to the governmental authority in the two
models. In the Pigovian tradition, the bureaucrat is both informed and
incorruptible; in the Coase framework, he is ignorant and incorruptible.
Agreement on this "incorruptibility" characteristic of governmental decision-makers, and indeed the introduction of the term "corruptible" in this familiar usage, suggests that there exist widely-shared
ethical presuppositions concerning the inalienability of the delegated
rights to make collective choices. That is to say, some shift away from
the unanimity rule for collective decisions may be accepted as
11. For an explicit statement of the Coase-Chicago position, see Demsetz, The Exchange and
Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J. Law &Econ. 21-2 (1964).
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necessary, with the accompanying acknowledgment that new and
previously nonexistent "rights of decision" are brought into being,
rights that have economic value that is potentially capturable by the
subset of the citizenry empowered to take decisions on behalf of all.
Such rights may, however, be considered to be inalienable; that is, the
holder is not entitled to sell them or to exploit his possession of them
2
through collection of personal rewards, either directly or indirectly.'
It would be inappropriate in this paper to examine in detail the
validity of such ethical presuppositions, although this opens up many
13
interesting and highly controversial topics for analysis.
The existence of such presuppositions can scarcely be denied. The
pejorative content of such terms as "vote-trading," "logrolling,"
"political favoritism," "spoils system," "pork barrel legislation"
-these attest to the pervasiveness of negative attitudes toward even
minor attempts on the part of possessors of political decision-making
rights to increase rental returns. If these attitudes are sufficiently
widespread, prohibitions against bureaucratic and political
rent-maximization may extend beyond the mere promulgation of
ethical norms for behavior. The rewards and punishments that are
consciously built into the governmental structure may be specifically
aimed at making such rent-maximization unprofitable for any person
empowered to take decisions on behalf of the whole group. The
designated bureaucrat who is assigned authority over one specific
aspect of public policy may not be morally or ethically inhibited from
accepting side payments. But he may face harsh legal penalties should
he accede to monetary temptations. To the extent that these
constitutionally-determined constraints insure that the economic
self-interests of governmental decision-makers dictate behavior unre12. In the paper previously cited, Calabresi and Melamed discuss the inalienability of rights
at some length, and particularly they draw attention to several examples where inalienability is
accepted. See Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 2.
The precise location of "inalienability" in the situation discussed may be questioned. In
delegating decision-making authority to an agent, citizens may not be considered to be
transferring the economic value inherent in the "right to choose." In this framework, it is the
rights of the citizenry which are "inalienable" in some fundamental sense, and the agent could
scarcely transfer a "right" which he does not possess. In my discussion, I have equated the
empirically observed delegation of decision-making authority with an effective transfer of a
valuable "right" which is then supposed to be "inalienable."
13. The ethical bases for such widely-shared attitudes may be challenged when the economic
analysis is carefully developed. In the case of marketing rights to make decisions for the
community, the relative undesirability of the distributional results provide a sufficient reason for
inalienability. Conceptually, the decision-maker can capture all of the potential surplus from
constitutionally-authorized action. In this limit, those who presumably make the constitutional
delegation of authority, the citizenry, find themselves with zero net gains from collective action.
So long as the delegation of decision rights along with inalienability is predicted to generate
positive net gains, the citizenry's economic position is enhanced. The possible inefficiency in the
standard allocative sense is more than offset by the distributional gains.
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sponsive to proffered side-payments (direct or indirect) it may be
argued, almost tautologically, that any outcomes chosen for the
community by the "incorruptibles" must be, by definition, classified as
"efficient." This would produce the paradoxical conclusion that the
conditions for efficiency depend critically on the institutional structure and that, even with unchanged personal evaluations, solutions
which are deemed efficient under one set of institutions may be
inefficient under another.
The avoidance of this paradox becomes possible if we are content
to define as allocationally efficient only that set of possible outcomes
that could emerge from the contractual negotiation process among
persons in the community, on the assumption that no rights are
inalienable. In this case, the introduction of inalienability in the rights
of governmental decision-takers clearly makes the theorem of allocational neutrality invalid. Under the highly restricted assumptions of
zero transactions costs, any activity will be efficiently organized in the
absence of governmental intervention, and, absent income effect
feedbacks, the allocational outcome will be invariant over differing
assignments of private and alienable rights. Under such conditions as
these, it is the inalienability of rights that the shift to the public sector
introduces which removes the guarantee that outcomes will be
efficient, not the shift to governmental decision-taking per se. If we
avoid the apparent paradox in this manner, however, the implication
is left that the constitutional shift of activities to the public sector is
an almost necessary source of inefficiency. When other considerations
are accounted for, however, this implication need not follow. When
transactions costs are recognized, and especially when distributional
implications are considered, efficiency "in the large" may dictate the
governmental organization of activities along with the inalienability
of the rights delegated necessarily to bureaucratic decision-makers.
There is no final escape from the requirements that each particular
institutional change proposed must be examined on its own merits, on
some case-by-case procedure, with the interdependence among
separate organizational decisions firmly in mind.

